Plan this weekAccount takeover

Stolen Microsoft 365 sessions hit 79 organizations: MFA alone did not stop it

Huntress reports a 10-week campaign that replayed stolen Microsoft 365 sign-in sessions to take over mailboxes, then replaced the MFA methods. Here is what to check in your own account today.

Updated 27 Oct 2026: see what changed

How urgent

Plan this week

Who is affected

Anyone who signs in to Microsoft 365 (Entra ID), above all small teams without Conditional Access. Huntress saw victims in 79 organizations

What to do

Open your Microsoft 365 account and check the registered MFA methods, the registered devices and the inbox rules. If anything looks unfamiliar, revoke sessions and then reset the password

Published 26 Oct 2026 · Sources last checked 27 Oct 2026No. 14 / 87

Updates, follow-ups and corrections

  1. Update · 27 Oct 2026. A related Kaspersky warning: legitimate Microsoft sign-in pages are being used as the bridge in phishing. In a press release of 22 Jul 2026 Kaspersky describes a campaign where a link led to a real Microsoft page and the victim was asked to enter a one-time code, which handed the attacker a signed-in session even after MFA. Kaspersky advises disabling the device code flow if you do not need it. Separately, Spanish-language and Indonesian press reports say Kaspersky saw more than 31,000 emails between 1 Aug and 18 Sep that linked to real Microsoft services and sent victims on to attacker pages, with lures such as "update your credentials" or "sign this document". We have not read Kaspersky's own report on that second campaign, so treat its figures as press-reported. Our advice, not Kaspersky's: a link on a Microsoft domain is not proof the destination is safe, so look at where a sign-in or consent page leads, never enter a code someone else gave you, and review which apps have access to your account.

We keep the original text. When something changes, when we follow a story, or when we get something wrong, we add a dated note here instead of editing silently.

What happened

On 22 October 2026 the security firm Huntress published research on a campaign against Microsoft 365 accounts that ran from 14 July to 22 September 2026. The attackers did not guess passwords. They stole sign-in sessions and replayed them, so the account let them in without asking for the MFAMFA (multi-factor authentication) A second proof that it is really you, on top of your password, such as a code from an app or a security key. Tap again to open the glossary code again. Huntress counted 79 organizations hit, at least 497 successful sign-ins and more than 200,000 failed attempts. Press coverage of the report puts the number of compromised accounts at 97. The 497 figure counts sign-in events, not people.

How the sessions were stolen

Huntress describes three ways:

  • Fake sign-in pages that relay the real one. The victim types the password and approves the real MFA prompt, and the page keeps the session that results.
  • Device-code phishingPhishing A message or page that pretends to be someone you trust to get you to hand over a password, a code or a payment. Tap again to open the glossary. The victim enters a code on Microsoft's own sign-in page, which hands the attacker valid tokens.
  • Social engineeringSocial engineering Tricking a person, instead of a machine, into giving access or information, for example by pretending to be a colleague or the help desk. Tap again to open the glossary during a legitimate sign-in.

The stolen sessions were then replayed from servers rented at a German hosting provider, often within minutes. Huntress says that provider offers legitimate hosting that attackers abuse, and the report does not name who is behind the campaign.

What the attackers did next

This is the part to check in your own account. According to Huntress, after getting in they:

  • Wiped the account's MFA methods and added their own authenticator. In 19 organizations this happened within three hours of the first sign-in. This access survives a password reset.
  • Registered rogue devices in the company directory (at least 48), with names like DESKTOP- plus eight characters, to keep getting new tokens.
  • Created hidden inbox rules, often with names like . or s, that moved or hid mail, many keyed on payroll or banking words.
  • In one case, sent a payroll email to an outside accountant and hid the replies. That is business email compromise.

Who is affected

Anyone who signs in to Microsoft 365, in particular small teams that rely on a password and an MFA prompt and have no Conditional Access policies. This is the kind of attack that works against a normal user who clicks a convincing page, so we cannot tell you that you are safe or not affected. The campaign ended in September, but the techniques are not new and can be used again.

What to do today

  1. Check your MFA methods. In your Microsoft account security settings, remove any authenticator you do not recognize.
  2. Check your registered devices. Look for devices you did not enroll, especially DESKTOP- names registered recently.
  3. Check your inbox rules. Look for rules with very short or odd names, or rules that move mail to RSS Feeds or Conversation History.
  4. If anything looks wrong, revoke all sessions first, then reset the password. Huntress warns that a password reset alone leaves the attacker's devices and MFA methods in place, and that a stolen access token can stay valid for about 90 minutes.
  5. If you manage the tenant: use Conditional Access to require MFA for all users and apps, and restrict the device-code flow, as Huntress recommends.

If you build with AI tools

Our advice, not from the report: AI assistants and automation tools often ask to connect to your mailbox or calendar. Each connection is another sign-in path. Review the enterprise applications and connected apps in your Microsoft account, remove the ones you no longer use, and be careful before approving a new one. Huntress also recommends restricting who can consent to new applications.

What we could not confirm

All the figures come from Huntress's own data and the post has some small internal inconsistencies in the phase-by-phase numbers; we use only the headline figures it repeats. We have not independently verified them, and the report attributes the campaign to no named group.

Terms explained in this article

  • MFA (multi-factor authentication): A second proof that it is really you, on top of your password, such as a code from an app or a security key.
  • Session token: A small piece of data a site gives your browser after you log in, so it remembers you without asking for the password again.
  • Phishing: A message or page that pretends to be someone you trust to get you to hand over a password, a code or a payment.

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