Attackers used Qubole's trusted AWS account to enter customers' cloud accounts and read secrets and S3 data: check your AWS roles that trust Qubole
Wiz reports that an attacker with credentials tied to Qubole's AWS account assumed roles that customers created for Qubole, between 14 and 26 Oct 2026, read secrets and S3 data, and tested the credentials it found. Wiz does not know how the credentials were obtained and Qubole has not commented. What we verified and what to check in your AWS accounts.
How urgent
Act now
Who is affected
Organizations with an AWS IAM role whose trust policy lets Qubole's AWS account (805246085872) assume it, including roles left over from a Qubole integration that is no longer used. Wiz does not say how many customers were affected
What to do
In every AWS account, list the roles that trust account 805246085872, delete or narrow the ones you do not need, search CloudTrail from 1 October 2026 for AssumeRole calls from that account that did not come from an AWS address, and rotate every secret those roles could read
Published 10 Nov 2026 · Sources last checked 10 Nov 2026No. 68 / 87
What happened
On 9 November 2026 Wiz published an investigation, done with Sentra and Mandiant, into attacks on several companies' AWS accounts. The attacker used credentials tied to an AWS account that Qubole's platform uses (account 805246085872) to call AssumeRole on roles that customers had created so Qubole could work in their accounts. Wiz saw this between 14 and 26 October 2026. A separate cluster on 8 to 11 October used customer-owned access keys created for Qubole integrations; Wiz says it cannot link the two.
Once inside, the attacker listed resources, then read secretsSecret (API key, token, password) Any piece of text that proves to a service that you are allowed in, such as an API key, a database password or an access token. Tap again to open the glossary from Lambda settings, Secrets Manager and SSM Parameter Store, tested the credentials it found (AWS keys, Microsoft Entra ID client secrets and Okta client credentials) and read data from S3, in some cases downloading whole buckets. Wiz says most of the roles it saw assumed were not otherwise in use: they were left over from integrations, with the trust policy still active.
Wiz also found a bootable disk image on a server the attacker used. It has not seen it deployed and cannot say how it would be used.
Who is affected
- Anyone with an AWS role that trusts Qubole's account. The role's trust policy names account 805246085872. Check every AWS account you own, not only the main one.
- Roles you forgot about. The attacker mostly used roles that nobody else was using.
- Secrets those roles could read. If a role could read Lambda settings, Secrets Manager, SSM parameters or S3 buckets, treat what is in them as seen.
- How many customers: Wiz says "multiple". It gives no number. Neither Wiz nor The Register reported a statement from Qubole or AWS.
What to do
- List the roles that trust account 805246085872 in every AWS account. Delete the ones for integrations you no longer use.
- Narrow the ones you keep. Wiz advises naming the specific IAM principal Qubole uses instead of the whole account, and adding a condition on the source network (aws:SourceIp) using the ranges the vendor documents. Wiz says a source-IP condition alone would have blocked every role assumption it saw. We did not check Qubole's documentation for those ranges.
- Search CloudTrail from 1 October 2026. Look for AssumeRole calls where the calling account is 805246085872 and the source IP is not an AWS address; Wiz says all the legitimate traffic it saw came from AWS. Any activity from the principal ID AIDA3W7DIFLYOLTK63SFS is worth investigating. The full list of addresses is in the Wiz post.
- For each session you find, read what it did afterwards, especially Secrets Manager, SSM Parameter Store, Lambda and S3. Reads of S3 objects only show up in S3 data events or server access logs, not in the normal CloudTrail events. If you did not have those turned on, you may not be able to tell what was read.
- Rotate every secret the role could read, and revoke the role's active sessions. Wiz notes that rotating a credential does not end sessions already issued.
- Treat the External ID as not secret. It appears in plain text in CloudTrail. Rotate it with the vendor after an incident.
- Log everything in every account: an organization trail across all accounts and regions.
What we could not confirm
We read the Wiz post and The Register's report. We could not find how the attacker got the credentials tied to Qubole's account: Wiz does not say. We do not know how many customers were affected, what data was taken from each, or whether Qubole has responded. Wiz says it has found no ties to other known activity and does not know the attacker's motive. We did not read the Sentra post, so we rely on Wiz for its findings. This is not a flaw in AWS itself, and we have no evidence that other vendors' integrations were affected.
Watch the short video
The video loads from YouTube (privacy-enhanced mode) only when you press play.
Comments
No account needed. Add a nickname if you like, or leave it empty to comment anonymously. Comments are reviewed before they appear. Links are not allowed.
We store your comment, your nickname and a scrambled form of your connection that we use only to limit spam. We do not store your IP address or set cookies. Cloudflare Turnstile checks that you are not a bot.
Sources and verification
- Wiz, Trusted by Default: Qubole Cross-Account Access Abused in the Wild (9 Nov 2026, read directly) (opens in a new tab)
- The Register, Attackers backdoor trusted AWS integrations to steal secrets (9 Nov 2026, press report, read directly) (opens in a new tab)
We use primary sources first and say when we rely on a news report. Dates are the day we last checked each source.
Spotted a mistake? Email [email protected] and we will correct it and note the change.