Attackers used 4,837 hijacked GitHub accounts to plant a CI secret stealer in thousands of repositories: check for the wfx-docs branch and rotate what your workflows can read
Since 10 November an attacker has used stolen GitHub credentials to open probe pull requests titled "docs: dependency audit notes" in 61,764 repositories and to plant a stealer for CI secrets and cloud credentials. Aikido says at least 1,835 repositories ran it. What to check in your repositories and what to rotate.
How urgent
Act now
Who is affected
Anyone who can write to a GitHub repository, including through an organization or collaborator access, and any project whose CI workflows can read secrets or cloud roles; developers who ran npm install on an affected commit
What to do
Search your repositories for a wfx-docs branch, the pull request "docs: dependency audit notes" or the commit messages listed below; if you find one, treat every secret and cloud role the workflows could read as compromised, rotate them, revoke the author's tokens, OAuth grants, SSH keys and sessions, and turn on 2FA
Published 12 Nov 2026 · Sources last checked 12 Nov 2026No. 80 / 87
What happened
According to Aikido Security, starting on 10 November an attacker used stolen credentials for 4,837 GitHub accounts to push a malicious workflow payload into repositories those accounts could write to. The payload steals the GitHub Actions secretsSecret (API key, token, password) Any piece of text that proves to a service that you are allowed in, such as an API key, a database password or an access token. Tap again to open the glossary and cloud credentials that a repository's CI workflows can reach. Aikido says the attacker's test pull requests were opened in 61,764 repositories, and that at least 1,835 repositories ran the payload, so their credentials have probably been taken. The Hacker News reported the same campaign with a figure of at least 1,806 repositories at the time of its article. Aikido tracks the campaign as wfx-loot.
Each attack began with a pull request titled docs: dependency audit notes, opened from a branch named wfx-docs, apparently to test whether the account could write to the repository. The stealer followed in some of them. The Hacker News says the attacker usually reverted the change within minutes and deleted the logs of the run where the stealer ran.
What the researchers measured
- Aikido: 4,837 compromised accounts opened probe pull requests in 61,764 repositories; at least 1,835 repositories ran the payload; at least 50 compromised users appear to publish packages for ecosystems including npm, Go, Packagist, PyPI or crates. The payload also reached at least one Packagist and one Go package through automated publishing, but Aikido says the attacker appears to be after CI secrets rather than spreading through the supply chainSupply chain attack An attack that reaches you through something you already trust and install, such as a code package, a tool or a provider. Tap again to open the glossary.
- SafeDep (as reported by The Hacker News): 8,093 repositories received malicious commits between 12:46 UTC on Tuesday 10 November and 04:36 UTC on Thursday 12 November, counting only the default branches of public repositories. In 7,309 of them the stealer was added to an existing workflow; in 771 it came as an npm postinstall hook, which also runs on a developer's machine during npm install.
- Reach beyond the accounts' own repositories: 10,431 of the test pull requests went into repositories the account did not own, through collaborator or organization access, and 92% of them were still open when Aikido checked.
- How the credentials were obtained is not explained in the analysis The Hacker News cites.
How serious it is
Active and wide: stolen credentials already worked, secrets were taken from more than a thousand repositories, and The Hacker News found new probe pull requests with the same title opened after Aikido's search ended. It is not a flaw in GitHub or in a package: it is account takeover plus a CI workflow that can read secrets. The damage depends on what your workflows can reach.
Signs your repository was hit
Check, in any repository you can write to, from 10 November onward (list from Aikido and The Hacker News):
- A branch named wfx-docs, short-lived branches named chore/ followed by eight random characters, or ci-check- followed by four digits.
- A pull request titled docs: dependency audit notes.
- Commit messages ci: refresh build cache (adds about 1,500 lines to an existing workflow), chore: add ci helper (adds a script and an npm postinstall hook), chore: add dependency audit workflow, chore: initial commit, ci: restore or ci: cleanup.
- Stealer script SHA-256 89695abb392d5cfd4972672961e644bb46baa98aa1ed7173c2a2816c762735cf, and outbound traffic to 194.150.166[.]244:8080, 18.143.168[.]96:8080 or 153.75.82[.]159:8080 (defanged).
- A repository can show no wfx-loot artifacts, no wfx- cache entries and no WFX-BEGIN step summaries and still have lost data; a missing run number on the attacker's commit is the more reliable sign, according to The Hacker News.
What to do
- Search your repositories (and your organization's) for the signs above, starting with the branch name and the pull request title. Any account that opened one of the attacker's test pull requests is compromised even if the stealer never ran, says Aikido.
- If a repository was hit, treat every secret and cloud role its workflows could read as compromised and rotate all of them; do not rely on the deleted logs to tell you what was taken.
- Revoke the commit author's tokens, OAuth app grants, SSH keys and sessions, and turn on 2FA (SafeDep's advice as reported by The Hacker News).
- If anyone ran npm install on an affected commit, treat that machine as compromised and rotate its keys.
- Reduce what a stolen account can do: require review before workflows from new branches run, limit workflow permissions, use short-lived cloud credentials in CI, and restrict who can write to your repositories.
- Block the listed IPs at your egress and look for past connections to them.
The last two steps are ours, not from the sources.
What we could not confirm
We read Aikido's post and The Hacker News article, and we did not read SafeDep's own post, so its figures are as The Hacker News reports them. The counts differ by source and by time (1,806 in The Hacker News against 1,835 at Aikido), because they were taken at different moments and the campaign was still going. How the attacker got the 4,837 sets of credentials is not explained. We did not run or analyze the stealer ourselves.
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Sources and verification
- Aikido Security, wfx-loot campaign pushes CI secret stealer to tens of thousands of repositories (12 Nov 2026; read 12 Nov 2026) (opens in a new tab)
- The Hacker News, Attacker Used 4,837 Hijacked GitHub Accounts to Run a CI Secret Stealer in 1,806+ Repositories (12 Nov 2026; read 12 Nov 2026; also reports SafeDep's separate analysis) (opens in a new tab)
- SafeDep, GitHub Actions wfx credential stealer (linked from The Hacker News; not read by us) (opens in a new tab)
We use primary sources first and say when we rely on a news report. Dates are the day we last checked each source.
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